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1 Introduction
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was an important philosopher, 
theologian and literary critic of the eighteenth century, whose thought profoundly 
influenced German poetics among his contemporaries.  In this thesis, I examine 
Herder's continued influence upon poetics into the twentieth century, specifically the 
work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), the philosopher known most for his work in 
fundamental ontology.  I contend that Herder's project of defining the genius forms 
not only the core of the Sturm und Drang period in which he was a central figure, 
inspiring important literary figures such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-
1832), but it also is a necessary backdrop for understanding Heidegger's project of 
conceptualizing the poet as the guardian of the Haus des Seins in the twentieth 
century.  Herder's failed project appears to account for Heidegger's retreat into the 
mystical when he formulates his own concept of the poet, even if Heidegger does not 
explicitly acknowledge this background.  Heidegger's poet, whom one might 
succinctly characterize as passively waiting for Being to speak and reveal poetic 
truth, may seem at first glance quite opposite from the active role of the genius in 
Herder's aesthetics, yet I will demonstrate the relevance of Herder's thought to poetics 
well past the eighteenth century by showing how his project informs Heidegger's in 
the twentieth century.  Heidegger's turn to the mystical work of Meister Eckhart 
(c.1260-c.1328) in his use of concepts such as "Gelassenheit" (letting-go) in a 
description of the passive role of the poet vis-à-vis "Sein" (Being) has confounded 
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supporters and critics alike, who see this mystical turn as inexplicable and not strictly 
philosophical.  In this thesis, I propose to explain this turn in Heidegger's thought 
from a point of view that, as of yet, has not been covered in scholarly work, by 
arguing that Heidegger's awareness of the failed genius aesthetic developed by Herder 
led him to develop his concept of the poet in such a way as to consciously avoid the 
problems inherent in Herder's theory.  What appears to many as an irrational turn in 
Heidegger's thought is actually, in part, a consequence of a quite rational attempt to 
avoid the problems that Herder encountered.
With a proper understanding of Herder's poetics as a background for 
Heidegger's thought, therefore, the roots of Heidegger's project become quite clear.  I 
will demonstrate that the failings of Herder's genius aesthetic, when addressed within 
the framework of Heidegger's ontological approach, explain Heidegger's development 
of the poet as seen in works such as Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, published first in 
1960 and based on lectures Heidegger gave in 1935-1936.  Indeed, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1900-2002), the renowned philosopher of hermeneutics and perhaps the 
person most intimately familiar with Heidegger's thought of any of Heidegger's 
students, left an important clue in this regard.  In Gadamer's afterword to Der 
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, he mentions in passing that Heidegger's emphasis of the 
direct relationship of the work of art to Being is a conscious attempt to avoid the 
problems of the genius aesthetic, first established by Herder in the eighteenth century: 
"Die Charakterisierung des Kunstwerks durch das In-sich-Stehen und das Welt-
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Eröffnen, mit der Heidegger einsetzt, vermeidet offenbar bewußt jeden Rückgriff auf 
den Geniebegriff der klassischen Ästhetik" (Gadamer in Heidegger, UK 105). 
Gadamer's authority in making such a pronouncement cannot be understated, not only 
because of his well-documented relationship to Heidegger and his reputation for 
understanding his teacher's work, but also because this very afterword was endorsed 
by Heidegger as an important introduction to his later work (Heidegger, UK 5).
My methodology for this thesis is as follows.  Following an explanation of 
Herder's genius aesthetic, I will examine its origin by examining the influences upon 
Herder's thought, principally those of the philosopher and theologian Johann Georg 
Hamann (1730-1788) and the poet Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (1724-1803), and the 
intellectual environment to which Herder was responding with his arguments for a 
new literature (section 2).  I will follow this in section 3 with a close reading of 
Herder's essay “Shakespeare,” exploring his attempt to concretize the genius aesthetic 
into a historical figure.  In doing so, I will also highlight specific themes of the 
“Shakespeare” essay which resonate with themes that I will later explore in 
Heidegger's work.  After examining the culmination of Herder's genius aesthetic in 
his treatment of Shakespeare, I will give an overview of the crucial problems inherent 
in his approach (section 4).  With the help of Peter Michelsen's critique of Herder, I 
will outline the possible ways in which one might go forward with that which might 
be salvaged in Herder's project.  Michelsen's suggestion that one might sidestep the 
problems in Herder's project by reframing the question of genius within a model that 
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stresses the poetic universe of the genius, decoupled from the notion of “historical 
reality,” seems to me to describe the basic methodology adopted by Heidegger, which 
I will describe in section 5.  I will show that Heidegger's procedure in developing his 
own concept of the poet owes much to Herder's project, in that it does appear to go 
forward with aspects of Herder's thought in a way suggested by Michelsen, with his 
application of fundamental ontology to poetics, specifically in his use of primordial 
time rather than the “historical reality” that caused Herder's theory to fail.  To this 
end, I will examine Heidegger's recently published lecture notes on Herder from 1939 
and his work on the origins of the work of art, to show the connection of themes 
between the former and the latter.  I will explain how Heidegger's ontological 
approach not only "solves" Herder's problems in a way suggested by Michelsen, but 
also that Heidegger comes full circle to the questions at the origin of Herder's genius 
aesthetic, namely, Herder's debate with Hamann.
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2 The Origin of the Genius Aesthetic in Herder's Thought
2.1 The Genius Aesthetic in Relationship to the Enlightenment
Herder's idea of genius in the Sturm und Drang is best understood if one first 
considers the thought against which Herder reacts with his aesthetic theory.  Herder 
saw the Enlightenment tendency to propose universal rules for social and ethical 
behavior as an unwarranted leap from the justifiable claims of Enlightenment science 
of being able to know the physical laws of nature (Berlin 169).  In spite of Herder's 
critique of the Enlightenment concept of genius, however, Herder was not anti-
Enlightenment.  As a leading Sturm und Drang proponent, Herder was not set on 
overturning the Enlightenment, but on correcting its excesses.  By excesses, Herder 
meant precisely the restriction of the creative process through the insistence on 
following universal rules that did not respect historical, cultural and linguistic 
differences.  This restriction comes about as a result of abstraction from nature, in 
which thinking becomes rational, philosophical and critical, and focuses on the 
creative process through the imposition of rules.  In his theoretical work, Herder 
sought to create an image of the genius that overcame the restrictions posed by 
Enlightenment thought.
In his essay “Von Kunstrichterei, Geschmack und Genie,” (1800) Herder 
outlines five characteristics of genius.  First, genius is inherent; it cannot be acquired 
through study.  Second, genius creates, generates and produces itself; as a living 
whole, it brings forth a work of art from itself.  Third, the genius brings forth a 
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thought in its entirety and into creation in a godlike manner.  Fourth, the genius' 
manner of creation is perfected, not in the lack of mistakes but in its idiosyncratic 
genus or form; the genius is not interested in imitating or judging others.  Fifth, as we, 
too, partake in the spirit of nature, out of which the genius creates, we may become 
congenial [mitgenialisch] by feeling what the genius feels (Herder, VKGG 118-9).
In order to understand the genius' relationship to language, we must remember 
that for Herder, language itself is a creation of nature, and it develops historically in 
an organic fashion.  In his essay “Über die neuere deutsche Literatur” (1766-1767), 
Herder shows how languages develop from the natural and the primitive to the 
abstract.  Language develops as an organism according to Herder’s organic view of 
history.  That a language is born from the emotional passions aroused by nature is 
central to the Sturm und Drang ideal of emphasizing passion and emotion over cold 
reason, and of nature as an inspiring force to a heretofore unregulated, natural 
language.  Herder explains this process when he states: “Man sang also, wie viele 
Völker es noch tun und wie es die alten Geschichtsschreiber durchgehends von ihren 
Vorfahren behaupten.  Man pantomimisierte und nahm Körper und Gebärden zu 
Hilfe; damals war die Sprache in ihren Verbindungen noch sehr ungeordnet und 
unregelmäßig in ihren Formen” (Herder, Ausgewählte Werke 27, my emphasis).
After this initial phase of language development, according to Herder, there is 
a second one that is rich in imagery and metaphor, the youthful language of poetry: 
“[...] man sang im gemeinen Leben, und der Dichter erhöhete nur seine Akzente in 
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einem für das Ohr gewählten Rhythmus; die Sprache war sinnlich und reich an 
kühnen Bildern; sie war noch ein Ausdruck der Leidenschaft, sie war noch in den 
Verbindungen ungefesselt” (Herder, Ausgewählte Werke 27).  The connection of an 
unregulated or more primal language to singing is reflected in Herder's praise for 
Klopstock over the English poet John Milton (1608-1674) in his work Briefe zur 
Beförderung der Humanität (1793-1797):  "Daß Klopstock zu seinem »Hermann« ein 
Glück fand, daß er durch seine Gesänge ihn und andre seines Geistes zu dieser 
Gattung einfacher Musik weckte, gehöret mit zu den glücklichen Begegnissen seines 
Lebens; dem blinden Barden in Britannien ward mit seinem »Lycidas« und »Samson« 
dies Glück nicht” (Herder, Briefe 2:121).
As a language matures and takes on the character of wisdom and political 
staidness [Gesetzheit], in Herder's theory, the youthful phase of poetry fades into the 
adulthood of prose.  In prose, Herder sees the alienation of art from nature: “Eine 
Sprache in ihrem männlichen Alter ist nicht eigentlich mehr Poesie, sondern die 
schöne Prose.  Jede hohe Stufe neiget sich wieder zum Abfall, und wenn wir einen 
Zeitpunkt in der Sprache für den am meisten poetischen annehmen, so muß nach 
demselben die Dichtkunst wieder neigen.  Je mehr sie Kunst wird, je mehr entfernet 
sie sich von der Natur” (Herder, Ausgewählte Werke 28).  During this phase in 
Herder's poetics, the use of untranslatable, beautiful and “patronymic” Idiotismen of a 
language begins to shrink and the rhythms of poetry begin to be replaced by the 
sounds of prose, with words being no longer freely-placed but closed off from each 
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other by periods.  As language loses its charms and impulse, beauty is replaced in 
importance by correctness (Herder, Ausgewählte Werke 28-9).
Genius for Herder promotes art in the same manner as nature, and it brings 
forth something whole.  It must not, therefore, be constrained by rules that have come 
about through an alienation from nature.  The fundamental and original difference 
between poetry and prose is evident in the fact, for Herder, that, “statt der Sprache der 
Leidenschaft ward sie eine Sprache des mittlern Witzes und endlich des Verstandes” 
(Herder, Ausgewählte Werke 31).  Through a passionate and emotional connection to 
nature, the genius has the ability to tap into the primordial relationship of humanity to 
nature and orient a people [Volk] to rhythms of nature previously unknown.  And so, 
as Peter Michelsen suggests in his article “Regeln für Genies. Zu Herders 
'Fragmenten' 'Ueber die neuere Deutsche Litteratur,'” from the volume Johann 
Gotffried Herder 1744-1803 (1987),  edited by Gerhard Sauder, the opposition to 
rules that would restrict that genius is a key component of Herder's theory, and of his 
critique of the Enlightenment: “So sieht Herder – Gedanken der Aufklärung 
folgerichtig weiterdenkend – die Sprache nicht als etwas Starres, ein für alle Male 
Gegebenes an, sondern als ein dem 'Gesetze der Veränderung' Unterliegendes, in der 
geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit Sich-Wandelndes” (Michelsen 226).  We can better 
understand these aspects of genius, namely, the connection of genius to nature and the 
opposition of genius to rules, if we examine the influence of Hamann and Klopstock 
on Herder's thought.  Herder's understanding of language develops as a consequence 
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of his study of Hamann, and his sense of the genius develops through his appreciation 
of Klopstock.  Furthermore, by taking a look at the origins of Herder's thought, we 
will also find an important clue to Heidegger's reception of Herder.
2.2 Hamann's Influence on Herder
When Isaiah Berlin comments on “linguistic patriotism" in his book Three 
Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (2000), he notes that Herder, in 
the development of his thought, is building upon a conscious program that had been 
pursued by German theologians, men of letters and philosophers, by those who had 
been defending the German language against Latin and French since the time of 
Luther, including the vigorous campaigning of Martin Opitz (1597-1639) in the 
seventeeth century, and, of course, a number of Herder's contemporaries, such as 
Gottfried Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) and Hamann (Berlin 169, 174).  Hamann. in 
particular, was especially influential to Herder in this regard.  In the following, I will 
address two aspects of Hamann's thought that were especially important in the 
formation of Herder's genius aesthetic: 1) Hamann's preference for the concrete realm 
of  nature over abstract reasoning, and 2) Hamann's theological aesthetics, in which 
the poet is seen as a prophet in communion with God.  These elements combine to 
form a particular view of the poet in relation to history and nature that, in the words 
of Isaiah Berlin, Herder took as an “article of faith” (Berlin 191).  In Hamann's 
theological aesthetics, the genius has the role of being the vehicle for God to 
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communicate truth in poetic images, shunning the rationalistic explanations of truth 
common to Enlightenment thought. Hans-Georg Kemper presents this idea as follows 
in his article “Gott als Mensch -- Mensch als Gott. Hamann und Herder” from the 
volume Johann Georg Hamann: Der hellste Kopf seiner Zeit (1998), edited by 
Oswald Bayer:
Gott akkomodiert sich in seiner Offenbarung also nicht etwa dem 
Vorstellungsvermögen des Menschen, um ihm auf noch sinnliche 
Weise eine vernünftige Erklärung der Schöpfung zu bieten [...], 
sondern Gott bietet scheinbar Wesentliches auslassend und scheinbar 
Unwichtiges mitteilend auf eine selbst den Engeln rätselhafte und die 
Intelligenz des Teufels in die Irre führende, aber von den Einfältigen  
verstandene Weise eine ‚Erzählung‛ seines Schöpfungs- und 
Heilshandelns, also Narration statt wissenschaftlicher Explikation 
(Kemper 159, qtd. in Fleck 41).
This anti-scientific view of the origin of language, specifically its rejection of the 
reduction of language to a discrete object of study without reference to an 
understanding of the origin of language itself, is shared by Herder.  Herder, however, 
differed from Hamann in his belief that the origin of language was no longer divine, 
but he took from Hamann the basis for his view of language as a living organism. 
Gerhard Kaiser, in his book Aufkl  ä rung Empfindsamkeit Sturm und Drang (1979), 
mentions that in Herder's “Über den Ursprung der Sprache” (1772): “...stimmt 
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[Herder] doch mit Hamann überein in der Würdigung der Sprache als eines Zugangs 
zum göttlichen Geheimnis der Welt, des Menschen und der Völker. [...] ist sie für 
Herder ein lebendig sich entwickelnder Organismus” (Kaiser 188).
This theological difference between Hamann and Herder is important, because 
it explains why Herder, while influenced by Hamann, was more inclined toward 
finding the sacred in the “living organism” of language, particularly in poetry.  More 
specifically, the significant development in Herder's theological departure from 
Hamann is an understanding of truth within a cultural context, through the living 
organism of language as a means of bringing truth to a specific people.  Christina 
Juliane Fleck offers a thorough explanation of the consequence of this view in her 
book Genie und Wahrheit (2005):
So können für Herder auch verschiedene Wahrheitsansprüche 
unterschiedlicher Religionen und Weltanschauungen nebeneinander 
gelten, da er alles auf den einen für alle täglich zu erlebenden Kern 
zurückführt.  Diese Schöpfungshieroglyphie inspirierte die Menschen 
auf unterschiedliche Weise ein und dieselbe, die Gottheit offenbarende 
Wahrheit zu verkünden (Fleck 80).
Thus, the elevation of poetry as a means of expressing a divine truth within a culture 
comes about through Herder's answer to a theological problem, as an aesthetic 
response to the question of transcendence and immanence.  Divine truth comes to 
light in various religions, mythologies and poetry, all specific to a given cultural 
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milieu for a people, as Herder argues in his essay “Älteste Urkunde des 
Menschengeschlechts” (1774-1776) (Fleck 80-1).
Herder, therefore, takes from Hamann both a preference for the concrete in the 
form of nature over the abstract, and a conception of the poet in communion with 
divine truth.  Herder, however, takes an aesthetic turn in his theology that leads to the 
development of his genius aesthetic, namely, that the poet is no longer the prophet in 
communion with God as in communion with a pure, eternal truth, but rather, the poet 
sees truth in God's creation, in nature, and finds expression for this truth in culturally 
specific ways in light of the nature that s/he sees.  Fleck describes this latter notion of 
truth as an “Urwahrheit” that for Herder consists of the presence of the divine in 
creation which can be evoked through poetic expression (Fleck 82).  Indeed, Herder 
takes Hamann's statement from his essay “Aesthetica in nuce” (1762) that “Poesie ist 
die Muttersprache des menschlichen Geschlechts” as a starting point for a theory 
uniting poetry and language (Kaiser 188).  When viewed in connection with the 
aesthetic turn away from Hamann as described above, however, Herder's 
understanding of poetry as the "mother tongue of the human race" can be summarized 
as follows: 1) poetry becomes for Herder not the result of cultural refinement, as it is 
viewed by the neoclassical school, but rather, much more the original expression of 
mankind's very being itself; 2) language, full of images and passions in its original 
state, develops gradually toward abstraction and conceptualism, losing in  its fullness 
what it gains in precision; 3) poetic expression of mankind's state yields thus to prose; 
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4) the poet alone retains access to the origins, finding his creative power by means of 
language, producing again in poetry the youthful passions and images of the 
language; 5) the original language of mankind is poetry; 6) the poet, therefore, is the 
master of his historical period, in that he renews languages and the thinking of a 
people (Kaiser 188).  These aspects of Herder's aesthetic theory informed Heidegger's 
concept of the poet.
2.3 Klopstock and the Development of the Genius Aesthetic for Herder
Bearing in mind the influence of Hamann upon Herder, and Herder's 
theological deviation from Hamann, it is not surprising that Herder seized upon 
Klopstock's work in his development of the genius aesthetic.  Indeed, Herder had 
already been stimulated by Hamann to study Klopstock's work, and it was 
Klopstock's lyrical poetry, his odes and elegies, that Herder valued above all of 
Klopstock's works (Lohmeier, as qtd. in Lee 54-5).  While Herder in his essay “Über 
die neuere deutsche Literatur” agrees with Klopstock critics such as Lessing, that 
Klopstock does not adequately prepare his readers for the intensity of emotion and 
sentiment in his poems, he differs from Lessing in that he seeks to explain why this 
might have occurred.  In her book Displacing Authority: Goethe’s Poetic Reception of 
Klopstock (1999), Meredith Lee observes that “Herder takes great pains to clarify [...] 
how an individual of deep religious feeling might easily be moved by single images 
or thoughts that to others seem quite obscure and without effect.  He uses the hymns 
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to articulate a more general concept of lyric poetry, one in which Klopstock excels” 
(Lee 55-56).
Let us examine more specifically how Herder views Klopstock's importance, 
and how these views build upon the influence of Hamann upon Herder and lead to 
Herder's theory of the genius aesthetic.  As we have seen with Herder's appropriation 
and alteration of Hamann's theological position, the poet takes the role of a master 
within a historical period, rejuvenating the language and thought of a people by 
means of his access to the origins of mankind's being or original state, mediated by 
his poetic language.  In Herder's references to Klopstock, it becomes apparent that 
Herder attempts to establish Klopstock as just such a figure for the German people.
In his “Über den Ursprung der Sprache,” Herder praises Klopstock in a 
manner that encapsulates exactly the points that Herder took from Hamann, namely, 
that Klopstock deals with the natural (as that which is concrete) over the abstract, and 
that Klopstock communes with the divine through nature.  He makes these points by 
positing Klopstock as the counterexample to the Swedish mystical theologian 
Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772):
Dies ist so wahr, daß es sogar Schwärmern und Entzückten nicht 
möglich ist, ihre neue Geheimnisse aus der Natur, aus Himmel und 
Hölle anders als durch Bilder und sinnliche Vorstellungen zu 
charakterisieren. Schwedenborg konnte seine Engel und Geister nicht 
anders als aus allen Sinnen zusammenwittern, und der erhabne 
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Klopstock – jenem die größeste Antithese! – seinen Himmel und Hölle 
nicht anders als aus sinnlichen Materialien bauen (Herder, Ursprung 
1:179).
Herder continues to make points about Klopstock in comparison with other literary 
figures throughout his writings, and this technique of definition is in keeping with the
 Sturm und Drang preference for the concrete examples over abstract concepts. 
Herder not only opposes the abstraction of neoclassicism, he also gives concrete 
examples of how other literary figures pale in comparison to Klopstock.  
This need for concretization and avoidance of pure theory will eventually lead 
to a very concrete example of Shakespeare as a representative of the genius aesthetic, 
as we shall see in the following section.  It is worth noting that Herder compared (and 
contrasted) Klopstock with another English poet in putting forward the program that 
he adapted from Hamann's theology, John Milton.  In his discussion of these two 
poets, Herder emphasizes the importance of poetic imagery in Klopstock.  In the 
eighth collection of his letters Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität Herder mentions 
that Klopstock, with his religious epic verse, is regarded by many as “der deutsche 
Milton,” but Herder sees a fundamental difference between the two poets, specifically 
with regard to their poetic muses, in spite of the fact that “Beide Dichter haben heilige 
Gedichte geschrieben” (Herder, Briefe 2:121).  Indeed, Herder writes that Milton 
(referring here specifically to Milton's works Lycidas (1638) and Samson Agonistes 
(1671)) and Klopstock stand in contrast to one another in a manner similar to Moses 
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and Christ, to the Old and New Testaments: “Miltons Gedicht, ein auf alten Säulen 
ruhendes durchdachtes Gebäude. Klopstocks Gedicht, ein Zaubergemälde, das in den 
zartesten Menschenempfindungen und Menschenszenen von Gethsemane aus über 
Erd und Himmel schwebet” (Herder, Briefe 2:121).  That Milton's poetry moves 
throughout rooms of the “old” and  “thought-out” building, whereas Klopstock's 
image-laden poetry paints pictures that bring heaven and earth together, is itself a 
suggestive poetic image that illustrates the Sturm und Drang program in both content 
and form: Klopstock's language is "new" in that it returns anew to the primal phase of 
language in imagery, and at the same time shows the "old" language of Milton's as too 
thought-out, abstract and unpoetic in comparison.
Herder goes on to point to the connection between Klopstock's muse and the 
world imagined in his poetry, and how it captures the souls of his contemporaries. He 
also contrasts this with Milton's “thought-out” odes: “Die Muse Miltons ist eine 
männliche Muse, wie sein Jambus; die Muse Klopstocks eine zärtere Muse, die in 
Erzählungen, Elegien und Hymnen unsre ganze Seele, den Mittelpunkt ihrer Welt 
durchströmet”  (Herder, Briefe 2:121).  In this respect, according to Herder, 
Klopstock fulfills the role of the poet as one who, through his command of the 
language, rejuvenates his people much more than Milton does: “In Ansehung der 
Sprache hat Klopstock auf seine Nation mehr gewirkt, als Milton vielleicht auf die 
seinige wirken konnte, wie er denn auch ungleich vielseitiger als der Brite über 
dieselbe gedacht hat. Eine seiner Oden im Geschmack des Horaz ist nach dem 
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Richtmaß der Alten mehr wert als sämtliche hochaufgetürmte britische 
Odengebäude” (Herder, Briefe 2:121).
It is this capacity of Klopstock's to captivate the soul of his contemporaries 
through the use of his imaginative, and indeed, image-laden, language, that Herder 
returns to in a passage from his Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769 (written in 1769, 
first published posthumously in 1846), in which he speaks of the power of 
Klopstock's images over the soul: 
Allmählich schließt sich die Seele, d.i. sie verarbeitet die vorigen 
Ideen: sie wendet sie an, sooft sie Gelegenheit hat: dadurch werden 
jene zurückgerufen und gleichsam stärker eingeprägt: immer 
zurückgerufen und immer stärker: das Gehirn also härter und fester: 
endlich werden sie eben durch die starke Erneurung die einzigen und 
ewig. Sie kommen immer wieder, und die Seele kann nichts denken, 
ohne daß sie wiederkommen (Herder, Journal 1:256).
Once again, Herder captures his philosophical content in a poetically with reference 
to the impact of images upon soul, and he keeps to the Sturm und Drang ideal of 
avoiding rule-based abstraction in setting up a new model for literature.  This 
component of the Sturm und Drang program, evident both in Herder's use of 
Klopstock as a concrete model of poetic rejuvenation for the German people and in 
Herder's poetic expression of that concrete example, which carefully avoids the 
contradiction of forming an abstract theory of the concrete, will feature in the next 
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two chapters as 1) the need for a concrete figure around which to form the genius 
aesthetic, and 2) the difficulty posed by forming a theory of poetics that must itself 
remain poetic.
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3 Shakespeare as the Concrete Example of Herder's Poetic Genius
The fullest expression of the Sturm und Drang concept of the genius can be 
found in Herder's treatment of Shakespeare, as explained succinctly by Wolfgang 
Stellmacher in his book Herders Shakespeare-Bild (1978): 
“Zum großen Leitbild für die Poesiekonzeption des Sturm und Drang 
wurde Shakespeare.  In ihm erblickten Herder und die übrigen Stürmer 
und Dränger das Musterbeispiel eines charakteristischen Künstlers, der 
sein großes Werk frei von höfischen Einflüssen in enger Verbindung 
mit dem Leben des Volkes geschaffen hatte” (Stellmacher 146).  
Shakespeare features in many of Herder's writings, including his fragments “Über die 
Neuere Deutsche Literatur,”  Journal meiner Reise, “Von Ähnlichkeit der mittlern 
englischen und deutschen Dichtkunst” (1777), and his letters on Ossian.  Most 
important, however, is his essay “Shakespeare,” (1773) in which Shakespeare takes a 
central role in Herder's formation of the genius aesthetic.
Shakespeare's role in Herder's conceptualization of the aesthetic genius stems 
from the fact that it is incumbent upon Herder to give a concrete example of genius, 
or otherwise risk being open to the same critique of excess abstraction in 
Enlightenment thought made by the theorists of the Sturm und Drang.  This 
movement toward "concretization" in Herder's thought  is apparent in his treatment of 
Shakespeare. In her book La formazione del canone shakespeariano tra identità 
nazionale ed estetica (Inghilterra e Germania 1700-1770), Gilberta Golinelli explains 
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Herder's purpose as follows:
Mentre nel saggio sulla letteratura tedesca, il genio è per Herder una 
sorta di potenziale popolare-universale, perché è un qualcosa che 
appartiene alle peculiarità della lingua e della cultura di un determinato 
popolo, cresciuto in precise condizioni climatico-naturali, nel saggio su 
Shakespeare il genio non significa solo ed esclusivamente un'entità 
astratta, ma è anche una figura concreta: è Shakespeare.
[Within his essay on German literature, the genius is potentially a 
popular and universal type for Herder, because it is something that 
belongs to the linguistic and cultural particularity of a certain people, 
having grown in precise natural climactic conditions.  In the essay on 
Shakespeare, the genius does not simply and exclusively signify an 
abstract entity, but it is also a concrete figure: it is Shakespeare.] 
(Golinelli 288, emphasis in original, my translation)
In Herder's Shakespeare essay, then, we see a determined shift toward finding a real-
world example of genius that fulfills the theoretical demands of the Sturm und Drang 
movement.  This task was important enough for Herder that he consistently revised 
and published his Shakespeare essay in consecutive years from 1771 to 1773 (Gjesdal 
22).  It is the most "radical" final draft that I will examine.
While Herder was far from being the first German literary critic to incorporate 
Shakespeare into literary theory, he makes it clear in the beginning of his essay that 
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his treatment of Shakespeare is unique, and he does this by defining his interpretation 
in opposition to previous critics, including those both favorable and unfavorable to 
Shakespeare.  "Die kühnsten Feinde Shakespeares" for Herder are those who, while 
perhaps conceding his greatness as a poet, criticize him as a dramatist, given that he 
did not follow the model of the three classical unities of drama as prescribed by 
Aristotle and accepted by other great dramatists (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:301). It 
was not only his unfavorable critics who viewed Shakespeare's lack of adherence to 
classical rules of drama as a weakness, but also "die kühnsten Freunde Shakespeares," 
who view Shakespeare as being great in spite of his lack of adherence to classical 
rules (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:301).  Hamann was just such a critic, who argued in 
his “Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten” (1759) that Shakespeare's genius overcame his 
ignorance or violation of the rules of drama: "Was ersetzt bey Homer die 
Unwissenheit der Kunstregeln, die ein Aristoteles nach ihm erdacht, und was bey 
einem Shakesspear die Unwissenheit oder Übertretung jener kritischen Gesetze? Das 
Genie ist die einmüthige Antwort" (Hamann 55).
Against each of these preceding common interpretations of Shakespeare 
within the tradition of German literary criticism, Herder posits a striking contrast in 
his view of Shakespeare.  He hopes to place Shakespeare "in ein volleres Licht" as a 
model for the Sturm und Drang, against the aforementioned viewpoints, each of 
which he viewed as falling victim to the same prejudice regarding Shakespeare: 
Wenn ich zeige, daß man von beiden Seiten bloß auf ein Vorurteil, auf 
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Wahn gebauet, der nichts ist, wenn ich also nur eine Wolke von den 
Augen zu nehmen, oder höchstens das Bild besser zu stellen habe, 
ohne im mindesten etwas im Auge oder im Bilde zu ändern: so kann 
vielleicht meine Zeit, oder ein Zufall gar schuld sein, daß ich auf den 
Punkt getroffen, darauf ich den Leser nun festhalte, “Hier stehe! oder 
du siehest nichts als Karikatur!” (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:301).
Before he gives his interpretation of Shakespeare's genius, Herder sets out to 
discuss the classical rules of Greek drama, which had been assumed by earlier critics 
to be valid for a discussion of Shakespeare, and he suggests at the outset that this 
assumption is false, given the entirely different cultures in which classical Greek and 
Shakespearean drama arose: "In Griechenland entstand das Drama, wie es im Norden 
nicht entstehen konnte. In Griechenland war's, was es in Norden nicht sein kann. In 
Norden ist's also nicht und darf nicht sein, was es in Griechenland gewesen. Also 
Sophokles' Drama und Shakespeares Drama sind zwei Dinge, die in gewissem 
Betracht kaum den Namen gemein haben" (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:302).  In view of 
the development of the classical Aristotelian rules for drama, namely the three unities 
of place, time and action, Herder argues that their development was, essentially, an 
organic development within ancient Greek culture, and therefore, entirely natural to 
that given cultural milieu.  Consequently, it was valid for those dramatists, such as 
Aeschylus and Sophocles, who composed drama within that culture. (Herder, 
“Shakespeare” 1:303-4)
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In explaining why these rules for judging art are no longer relevant, Herder 
introduces his view of history as organic, wherein art is an outgrowth of the nature of 
a people [Volk].  For Herder, Aristotle's standards for judging art are dead rules, never 
meant to be used for works of a different age: “O wenn Aristoteles wieder auflebte 
und den falschen, widersinnigen Gebrauch seiner Regeln bei Dramas ganz andrer Art 
sähe!” (Shakespeare 1:305).  As nature itself changes, so must everything in the world 
change, according to Herder, including the rules for drama, which grew out of a 
bygone culture.
At this point, Herder begins to define the specific characteristics of genius that 
he sees in Shakespeare.  They can be summed up briefly as follows: 1) Shakespeare is 
a "natural" artist, whose work is connected both to nature and to the people [Volk]; 2) 
Shakespeare's genius and originality are not more natural than those of the Greeks--he 
is instead a kindred spirit to the Greeks in that his work, like theirs, is natural, and not 
an imitation; and 3) Shakespeare's work represents an entire artistic "world" in the 
greatness of which the reader might become lost.  These three aspects of 
Shakespeare's genius as Herder explains them, foreshadow Heidegger's thought in 
three distinct ways.  Heidegger views the poet as connected to nature and a culture 
through a special relationship with Being.  He also finds a kinship with the inner spirit 
of Greek art, if not in its outer form, in his conception of the role of the poet, and he 
explains the role of the poet in setting up a "world" for the reader.
 27
3.1 Shakespeare's relationship to nature
Rather than simply adopting the rules of Aristotelian drama from a bygone era 
and culture, Shakespeare's approach is more "natural" to Herder in that it relates 
organically to the culture in which he lived, and because it speaks directly to the 
people [Volk] of that cultural milieu in a vernacular language unrestrained by concern 
for abstract rules.  Herder concludes that Shakespeare invented drama for his era, 
precisely because he grounded it within the cultural understanding of his time and 
place, rather than imitating past drama:
Lasset uns also ein Volk setzen, das aus Umständen, die wir nicht 
untersuchen mögen, Lust hätte, sich statt nachzuäffen und mit der 
Walnußschale davonzulaufen, selbst lieber, sein Drama zu erfinden: so 
ist's, dünkt mich, wieder erste Frage: wenn? wo? unter welchen 
Umständen? woraus soll's das tun? [...] Es wird sich, wo möglich, sein 
Drama nach seiner Geschichte, nach Zeitgeist, Sitten, Meinungen, 
Sprache, Nationalvorurteilen, Traditionen, und Liebhabereien [...] 
erfinden – und das Erfundne wird Drama sein, wenn es bei diesem 
Volk dramatischen Zweck erreicht (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:308-309).
Shakespeare invents drama here in the sense of a plant that grows from its native 
soil.¹ This natural process takes place as an event during which the creative spirit is 
allowed to flow naturally in its time and place, and not be constrained by the "rules"; 
it is in Herder's words an “Eräugnis” that comes to pass through the possibilities of 
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the new language of the time. This process has a corollary in Heidegger's later 
concept of Ereignis.  Herder explains the "Eräugnis" seen in Shakespeare's work as 
follows:
Er fand keinen so einfachen Geist der Geschichte, der Fabel, der 
Handlung: er nahm Geschichte, wie er sie fand, und setzte mit 
Schöpfergeist das verschiedenartigste Zeug zu einem Wunderganzen 
zusammen, was wir, wenn nicht Handlung im griechischen Verstande, 
so Aktion im Sinne der mittlern, oder in der Sprache der neuern Zeiten 
Begebenheit (événement) großes Eräugnis nennen wollen (Herder, 
“Shakespeare” 1: 310)
In Herder's understanding of Shakespeare, this great dramatist's genius exists in his 
ability to capture the essence of his culture in language, to use language in such a way 
that it relates to the nature of life as it was lived in his culture.  In so doing, 
Shakespeare invents language and art by returning to nature and throwing aside 
abstract rules that no longer applied to the Nordic peoples of his time.  To write 
naturally, as it were, is to capture the essence of the soul of those within the culture, to 
raise that essence from the soil as organically as a plant does when it grows and 
extends into the ether, as Shakespeare's work did for the Nordic peoples.  Herder 
notes: "Wenn in jenem eine singende feine Sprache, wie in einem höhern Äther tönet, 
so spricht dieser die Sprache aller Alter, Menschen und Menscharten, ist Dolmetscher 
der Natur in all ihren Zungen – und auf so verschiedenen Wegen beide Vertraute einer 
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Gottheit? – Und wenn jener Griechen vorstelle und lehre und rühre und bildet, so 
lehre, rührt und bildet Shakespeare nordische Menschen!" (Herder, “Shakespeare” 
1:310).  This comparison leads us to the second major aspect of Herder's 
"Shakespeare" essay: his view that Shakespeare, as a natural artist, as  genius, was a 
kindred spirit to the Greeks.
3.2 The Genius of Shakespeare Makes Him a Kindred Spirit to the Greeks
One must resist the misconception that Herder's arguments against the French 
neo-classicist use of ancient Greek rules for modern drama imply somehow that the 
ancient Greeks were not themselves natural,  not possessed of genius.  Rather, 
Herder's "Shakespeare" essay makes clear that he held the ancient Greeks in high 
regard, and he finds in Shakespeare the natural Nordic genius equivalent to the 
ancient Greek genius displayed in the work of Sophocles.  Perhaps paradoxically, it is 
in Shakespeare's eschewing of the rules of ancient Greek drama that he rises to the 
level of genius last seen in ancient Greece.  That is to say, in Shakespeare's 
originality, in his natural approach, in his culturally grounded art, he is the Nordic 
equivalent to the genius exemplified by the ancient Greeks, which the French neo-
classicists vainly (in Herder's view) attempted to imitate (Herder, “Shakespeare” 
1:307-8).
Whereas the French fall short of the greatness of Sophocles for Herder, 
Shakespeare is the Nordic equivalent to Sophocles as a genius of his own culture: "o 
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Aristoteles, wenn du erschienest, wie würdest du den neuen Sophokles [Shakespeare] 
homerisieren! würdest so eine eigne Theorie über ihn dichten. [...] Würdest zu 
Sophokles sagen: male das heilige Blatt dieses Altars! und du o nordischer Barde alle 
Seiten und Wände dieses Tempels in dein unsterbliches Fresko!" (Herder, 
“Shakespeare” 1:310)  Indeed, Herder even goes so far as to refer to Sophocles and 
Shakespeare as brothers, based on their inner similarities and natural approaches, in 
spite of the obvious differences:
Eben da ist also Shakespeare Sophokles' Bruder, wo er ihm dem 
Anschein nach so unähnlich ist, um im Innern, ganz wie er, zu sein.[...] 
Sophokles blieb der Natur treu, da er eine Handlung eines Orts und 
einer Zeit bearbeitete: Shakespeare konnt ihr allein treu bleiben, wenn 
er seine Weltbegebenheit und Menschenschicksal durch alle die Örter 
und Zeiten wälzte (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:315).
In defining Shakespeare's connection to the Greeks, then, Herder's position against 
the French neo-classicists becomes most clear in his definition of genius.  Whereas 
the French neo-classicists, for Herder, are pre-occupied with imitating the outer 
characteristics of past works of genius, and vainly attempt unnaturally to apply 
outdated rules from another culture to their own, Shakespeare is a genius precisely 
because of his inner connectedness to nature and rootedness in his own culture, in a 
manner comparable to the inner genius of the ancient Greeks.  It is this inner genius 
that allows Shakespeare to capture the essence of his world.
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3.3 Shakespeare's Work Captures the Essence of his World
This "natural" relationship to his world is what connects Shakespeare to the 
Greeks on an inner level of genius, but it also connects him to his readers.  As a 
genius of the Nordic peoples, he speaks to their soul in a way that those imitating 
other cultures cannot.  For Herder, Shakespeare creates drama that is as wide and 
deep as nature, and in doing so he also gives his audience the perspective to see such 
breadth and depth.  For this reason, according to Herder, Shakespeare had no need of 
the three traditional Aristotelian unities in drama, for he was able to unite things as no 
one before him in an original, culturally modern way: “Fand Shakespeare den 
Göttergriff, eine ganze Welt der disparatesten Auftritte zu einer Begebenheit zu 
erfassen” (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:312).  That Shakespeare produced such a unity 
from within his own cultural perspective, and in so doing showed his contemporaries 
their own cultural perspective as distinct from the perspective of the ancients, is the 
basis of Herder's claim that Shakespeare gives his audience perspective, and it is 
central to Herder's choice of Shakespeare as a role model for his concept of genius.
In awakening his audience to their own cultural perspective, Shakespeare's 
genius shows a wholeness of his works as culturally grounded works of art that are so 
close to nature and the life of the audience that the people are able to lose themselves 
in the completeness of his work, speaking directly to their souls.  Herder describes his 
own reaction to reading Shakespeare in these terms:
Mir ist, wenn Ich ihn lese, Theater, Akteur, Kulisse verschwunden! 
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Lauter einzelne im Sturm der Zeiten wehende Blätter aus dem Buch 
der Begebenheiten, der Vorsehung der Welt! – einzelne Gepräge der 
Völker, Stände, Seelen! die alle die verschiedenartigsten und 
abgetrenntest handelnden Maschinen, alle – was wir in der Hand des 
Weltschöpfers sind – unwissende, blinde Werkzeuge zum Ganzen 
eines theatralischen Bildes, einer Größe habenden Begebenheit, die 
nur der Dichter überschauet. Wer kann sich einen größern Dichter der 
nordischen Menschheit und in dem Zeitalter! denken! (Herder, 
“Shakespeare” 1:310)
Such a rhapsodic view of Shakespeare calls to mind the young Goethe,  Herder's 
correspondent in Strasbourg, who praised Shakespeare's genius himself in such 
Herderian tones in his 1771 talk “Zum Shakespeares-Tag”  that Hamann actually 
believed Goethe's talk to have been written by Herder himself (Lee 80).  Goethe's 
talk, given while Herder was still revising his Shakespeare essay, gives an indication 
of the role that Shakespeare began to play for the Sturm und Drang as the concrete 
example of genius, specifically with respect to this question of "world creation" and 
its effect upon the reader.  In a manner similar to Herder, Goethe describes his first 
reading of Shakespeare as follows:
Die erste Seite, die ich in ihm las, machte mich auf zeitlebens ihm 
eigen, und wie ich mit dem ersten Stücke fertig war, stund ich wie ein 
Blindgeborner, dem eine Wunderhand das Gesicht in einem 
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Augenblicke schenkt.  Ich erkannte, ich fühlte aufs lebhafteste meine 
Existenz um eine Unendlichkeit erweitert, alles war mir neu, 
unbekannt, und das ungewohnte Licht macht mir Augenschmerzen. 
Nach und nach lernt' ich sehen, und, Dank sei meinem erkenntlichen 
Genius, ich fühle noch immer lebhaft, was ich gewonnen habe (Goethe 
48-9).
Goethe then expounds on themes quite similar to Herder's as he praises Shakespeare's 
imaginative power in transcending Aristotle's rules for drama, criticizes French 
dramatists for their imitation of the Greeks, and finally claims that Shakespeare's 
works are beyond the reach of philosophers: “seine Stücke drehen sich alle um den 
geheimen Punkt (den noch kein Philosoph gesehen und bestimmt hat), in dem das 
Eigentümliche unsres Ichs, die prätendierte Freiheit unsres Wollens, mit dem 
notwendigen Gang des Ganzen zusammenstößt” (Goethe 50).  Finally, Goethe 
connects Shakespeare's genius to a Sturm und Drang theme, namely the invocation of 
nature:  “Und ich rufe: Natur!  Natur!  nichts so Natur als Shakespeares Menschen” 
(Goethe 51).
The idea of "ein vollkommenes Ganzes" is central in Herder's definition of 
Shakespeare's genius and, correspondingly, in his condemnation of the neo-classical 
critics of Shakespeare:
Und wenn nun in dieser glücklich oder unglücklich veränderten Zeit, 
es eben ein Alter, ein Genie gäbe, das aus seinem Stoff so natürlich, 
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groß, und original eine dramatische Schöpfung zöge, als die Griechen 
aus dem ihren – und diese Schöpfung eben auf den verschiedensten 
Wegen dieselbe Absicht erreichte, wenigstens an sich ein weit vielfach 
Einfältiger und Einfach-Vielfältiger – also (nach aller metaphysischen 
Definition) ein vollkommenes Ganzes wäre – was für ein Tor, der nun 
vergliche und gar verdammte, weil dies zweite nicht das erste sei? 
(Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:309)
The neo-classical literary critics, by clinging to a tradition based on abstract rules, are 
fools for Herder, because they overlook the perfection in Shakespeare's world-
building.  But Shakespeare's genius is not merely in his ability to build a world within 
art that corresponds to nature that is culturally grounded and moves the souls of the 
audience, but also, in conjunction with Goethe's ideas, in the idea that the reader of 
Shakespeare learns to see his own world anew as a result of the completeness of the 
articulated vision.  Herder exclaims: "wie wird das Ganze der Begebenheit mit tiefster 
Seele fortgefühlt und geendet!– Eine Welt dramatischer Geschichte, so groß und tief 
wie die Natur; aber der Schöpfer gibt uns Auge und Gesichtspunkt, so groß und tief 
zu sehen!" (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:312).
At the same time, Herder is conscious of the fact that in discussing this aspect 
of world creation and the relationship to the soul, he runs the risk of formulating 
abstract rules, in much the same way as the neo-classicists whom he criticizes.  Near 
the end of the Shakespeare essay, Herder speaks of Shakespeare's ability to create a 
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world, while claiming that it is impossible to adequately describe in words what 
Shakespeare achieves.  The following passage is instructive, for Herder addresses this 
inadequacy in descriptive ability by reverting to the poetic metaphor that he used 
earlier in the essay of the plant that grows forth out of its native soil:
Hätte ich doch Worte dazu, um die einzelne Hauptempfindung, die also 
jedes Stück beherrscht, und wie eine Weltseele durchströmt, zu 
bemerken.[...] wäre es möglich, doch das in Worte zu fassen, wie das 
alles zu einer Welt der Trauerbegebenheit lebendig und innig gehöre – 
aber es ist nicht möglich. Kein elendes Farbengemälde läßt sich durch 
Worte beschreiben oder herstellen, und wie die Empfindung einer  
lebendigen Welt in allen Szenen, Umständen und Zaubereien der 
Natur.[...] geht es durch, versuche etwas der Art wegzunehmen, zu 
tauschen, es gar auf ein französisches Bretterngerüste zu simplifizieren 
– eine lebendige Welt mit allem Urkundlichen ihrer Wahrheit in dies 
Gerüste verwandelt – schöner Tausch! schöne Wandlung!  Nimm 
dieser Pflanze ihren Boden, Saft und Kraft, und pflanze sie in die Luft: 
nimm diesem Menschen Ort, Zeit, individuelle Bestandheit – du hast 
ihm Otem und Seele genommen, und ist ein Bild vom Geschöpf 
(Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:315).
This long passage is noteworthy for several reasons.  First, Herder introduces the 
example of Shakespeare, as we have noted, because the ideology of the Sturm und 
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Drang required a concrete example of genius to advance its aesthetic principles 
beyond the abstract rules of the neo-classical critics, but here we also see how that 
very act of making aesthetic pronouncements concrete finds its own limits in 
language.  By raising Shakespeare to the height of the genius ideal, in this, his most 
radical essay, Herder approaches the limit of that which can be said about genius 
itself as an abstract notion.  Second, Herder's use of poetic metaphor here to fill in the 
chasm in which discursive thought cannot operate is, within the framework of Sturm 
und Drang thought, perfectly consistent with the theory of poetry being closer to 
nature, and therefore, to the soul.  If Herder is going to speak to the issues of the 
"Weltseele" and the completeness of the living world brought into existence by 
Shakespeare, the concrete genius, and cannot, therefore, dissect that world into dead 
abstraction, he must then move in the opposite direction.  He must provide a 
metaphor consonant with his organic view of history in order to describe that 
development from within that organic movement, as opposed to the sort of abstract 
analysis from an outside perspective that would contradict the basic principles of the 
Sturm und Drang.  Third, Herder's idea of world creation and its poetic metaphor, as 
the central motif brought to its limit here in the Shakespeare essay, informs 
Heidegger's ideas, when he explains his concept of "Welt" in such a way as to avoid 
the problems of Herder's genius aesthetic.  It is therefore both necessary and 
appropriate to explain the flaws in Herder's theory, now that its limits have been 
shown, in order to better understand Heidegger's concept of the poet.
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4 Flaws within Herder's aesthetics
4.1 Herder's Inconclusive Ending to the "Shakespeare" Essay
As we have seen, the ideology of the Sturm und Drang places a theoretical 
limit on Herder's ability to describe precisely how the genius sets about the task of 
creation.  The problematic question that persists in Herder's aesthetic of the genius is 
the following: how can Herder define the process of a genius bringing work into 
being without contradicting himself and becoming a Kunstrichter?  Herder reached 
the limits of his critique through the Shakespeare essay, and those limits emerge quite 
clearly in his concluding passage, in which Herder touches upon the question of how 
Shakespeare was able to form his own unity instead of adapting the unities proposed 
by Aristotle. Remarkably, Herder does not actually answer his own question:
Nun finge eben das Herz meiner Untersuchung an, »wie? auf welche 
Kunst und Schöpferweise Shakespeare eine elende Romanze, Novelle 
und Fabelhistorie zu solch einem lebendigen Ganzen habe dichten 
können? Was für Gesetze unsrer historischen, philosophischen,  
dramatischen Kunst in jedem seiner Schritte und Kunstgriffe liege?« 
Welche Untersuchung! wieviel für unsern Geschichtbau, Philosophie 
der Menschenseelen und Drama. – Aber ich bin kein Mitglied aller 
unsrer historischen, philosophischen und schön-künstlichen 
Akademien, in denen man freilich an jedes andre eher, als an so etwas 
denkt! (Herder, “Shakespeare” 1:318)
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In his colossal two-volume work Herder (1877-1885), Rudolf Haym responds to this 
issue when he notes that Herder's treatment of Shakespeare, which Haym terms a 
"Rhapsodie," revolves around understanding Shakespeare principally as a poet rather 
than a dramatist, and that such a treatment explains why Herder backs away from the 
central question of explaining exactly how Shakespeare the poet created a new 
dramatic unity (Haym 1:469).  Indeed, the fact that Shakespeare's genius can be 
acclaimed as having a cultural-historical grounding itself suggests that elements 
within it are recognizable as unity-forming, yet Herder shies away from showing how 
that unity is formed.  Herder is caught between the iconoclastic aspects of genius as 
he defines it, with all of its opposition to rules and abstraction, and the need to explain 
abstractly, with some sort of standard, the process by which such genius can be 
recognized.
4.2 Herder's Sense of "Reality" is Equivocal: the Poetic Universe vs 
Historical Reality
Addressing the same above-cited passage from Herder, Eva Knodt, in a 
chapter from the book Johann Gottfried Herder: Language, History and the 
Enlightenment (1990), edited by Wulf Koepke, goes as far as to suggest that in shying 
away from answering the question that he indicates as being “the heart of the matter,” 
Herder is implicitly denying the explanatory nature of his own model (Knodt 218). 
Knodt goes further than Haym when she suggests that the problem here is more than 
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a philosophical predicament for Herder as he attempts to avoid becoming a “critic.” 
Rather, Knodt points to Herder's silence on this matter as showing that his treatment 
of Shakespeare is itself not critical, but in fact, poetic in nature, a “'rhapsody' that 
mediates between the aesthetic experience and its object by way of analogy and 
metaphor” (Knodt 219).  Knodt, therefore, sees Herder as ultimately violating the 
form of Shakespeare's vision in order to create it anew as a form.
In more concrete terms, Knodt seems to locate the problem for Herder within 
the cultural-historical framework that informs his understanding of genius: if poetic 
genius can be recognized in Shakespeare's ability to transcend the Aristotelian frame 
of reference, and in his ability to draw spectators into his own poetic universe, then is 
such genius not actually manifest in its ability to transcend perceived historical reality 
and time itself while creating a world of its own?  Knodt characterizes Herder's 
treatment of history in this regard as “history that ironically recognizes itself as poetic 
fiction – nothing but a 'dream' created by our own desire for order and self-
justification – and yet insists on this fiction as constituting the reality of our culture” 
(Knodt 221, emphasis in original).
Here Knodt hits upon the fundamental flaw in Herder's interpretation in a way 
that merits further examination.  If, as Knodt suggests, Herder recognizes 
Shakespeare's genius in the poetic universe that Shakespeare creates, a universe that 
rises above that within received historical tradition, then Herder faces the problem of 
explaining how one could locate this poetic universe as the ground for a cultural 
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reality, a reality that itself stands within received historical tradition.  This problem is  
further compounded by the inherent contradiction in Herder's theory of proposing 
historical determinism in the development of language and culture while trying 
simultaneously to revive language and culture.  Michelsen suggests that Herder tacitly 
addressed this contradiction in what went unsaid in Herder's discussion of 
dithyrambic poets.  The dithyrambic poet, whose Dionysian attributes of composing 
with passion and without regard for rules correlate directly to the Sturm und Drang 
concept of the genius advanced by Herder, is described by Herder in hypothetical and 
optative tones, suggesting to Michelsen that Herder did not see the possibility of a 
revitalization of German language and culture through Klopstock or any other 
“genius” (Michelsen 235).  
This problem is directly related to Herder's organic notion of culture, and to 
his concept of genius, rooted in the poetic vision that transcends dead historical 
models.  If Herder recognizes the development of language and culture within a 
historical context that is organic in nature, then he is putting forward an irreversible 
process of development.  What sense, then, can be made of the genius sweeping aside 
the dead historical models to revitalize a process that cannot be reversed?  Herder's 
theoretical model does not permit an answer to this question.
4.3 What can be salvaged from Herder's project?
If anything, the objections by Haym and Knodt, as well as the point made by 
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Michelsen about Herder's implicit recognition of the impossibility of revitalizing the 
German language through a German dithyrambic poet, suggest that the relationship of 
genius to history must itself be redefined if any of Herder's project can be salvaged. 
Either the genius must be given more of a role in the foundation of culture itself, with 
less emphasis on the historicist model used by Herder, or the genius must be 
grounded in something other than the type of historicist model posited by Herder, 
with “origins” of culture and genius being located in something more akin to the 
development of a poetic universe, alluded to by Knodt and less related to “historical 
reality” as such. Michelsen frames the alternatives similarly in the following manner: 
“Der geschichtlichen Überlieferung – und den durch sie bedingten Fesseln – den 
Ursprung gegenüberzustellen, könnte bedeuten: alles Gelernte zu zerstören und nur 
das Ich erfinden zu lassen [...]  Es könnte aber auch heißen [...], daß 'Ursprung' 
letztlich nicht als historischer, sondern als methodischer Begriff gedacht ist, ein 
Begriff, der weniger die Herkunft als [...] den Weg, anzeigt.” (Michelsen 236-7).
The option of giving the genius the primary role in culture creation, and 
putting the historicist model to the side, does not seem to continue Herder's project in 
any way that could be termed “salvaging” the project.  Genius for Herder can only be 
recognized as such by a people [Volk] and grows from the soil of a culture; genius is 
recognized in the ability to bring forth in poetry the primordial relationship between 
man and nature—yet the genius creates poetry, not nature itself.  Decoupling genius 
from history and tradition altogether could ultimately lead to a nihilist model that  
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would undermine not only the basic ideas of the Sturm und Drang, advanced in 
Herder's concept of genius, but also the Enlightenment ideas that Herder was trying to 
correct and balance by advancing such a concept.²
If, however, the question of genius is reframed explicitly within a model that 
stresses the poetic universe of the genius as a means of returning to the primordial 
relationship of man to nature, sweeping aside the dead models of history without 
stressing the “historical reality” of such a poetic model as the foundation of a new 
culture, Herder's project can go forward relatively intact.  Haym's and Knodt's 
criticism of the problematic passage near the end of his Shakespeare essay can then 
be sidestepped.  Rather than stressing the “how” in the question of the way in which a 
genius brings forth a new unity, the “how” could be viewed not as within the 
providence particular to and devised by a given genius, but rather as the method that 
gives birth to the genius, or perhaps better stated, to the works of genius.  Thus, the 
works of the genius are made possible through the process of withdrawing from the 
old, dead models and viewing nature anew.  This subtle change in methodology 
preserves the fundamental relationship between nature, poetry and genius that Herder 
stresses – but it places these elements not in a cause and effect relationship, but rather 
as co-dependent factors resulting from the process of withdrawing from “historical 
reality” into a “poetic universe.”  It might even be plausibly argued that  Martin 
Heidegger's approach to the use of poetry as a means of pursuing the question of 
man's relationship to Being is precisely a continuation of Herder's project along these 
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lines.  In fact, Heidegger uses imagery remarkably evocative of Herder to draw out a 
more mystical and less Enlightenment-oriented relationship between genius, poetry 
and nature.
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5 Understanding Heidegger's Poet as a Response to the Flaws in Herder's 
Genius Aesthetic
The role of the poet [Dichter], as described in Heidegger's middle and later 
works³, is perhaps one of the closests attempt made by anyone to salvage many of the 
main strands of Herder's project while reformulating the very parts that are the most 
troublesome, in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of Herder's project.  I must first issue a 
few caveats to make it clear what precisely I am claiming, and perhaps more 
importantly, what I am not claiming.  I am not claiming that Heidegger's Dichter is 
merely an upgraded version of Herder's Genie, with the problematic areas of Herder's 
aesthetics neatly excised, for it is clear that Heidegger claims others, such as Meister 
Eckhart, as important influences in his development of the "poet."  What I do claim is 
that Heidegger's explanation of the work of art and of the poet owes a lot to Herder's 
project, and therefore, finds in the failure of the former the beginning of its own 
approach, even if not explicitly acknowledged.  We shall see in examining 
Heidegger's Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes and other related writings that he appears 
to consciously attempt to build his theory while avoiding the pitfalls inherent in 
Herder's work.  I also argue that Michelsen's second suggested "solution" to the 
problems in Herder's genius aesthetic can be found in approximate form in 
Heidegger's work, which contains many of the same important characteristics of the 
genius aesthetic while making the adjustment suggested by Michelsen, that of 
approaching the question of origin from a methodological, as opposed to historical, 
perspective.  
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Let it be clear that I am not claiming that Heidegger's work is a continuation 
of the genius aesthetic, nor that it is even an attempt to save the genius aesthetic per  
se.  It is more that Heidegger takes Herder's failure as a starting point and then 
formulates a new concept of the poet.  It is my hope that by relating Heidegger's 
project to Herder's, I might help elucidate how and why Heidegger came to form the 
portrait of the poet that he did.  Indeed, I contend that an understanding of 
Heidegger's attempts to avoid the problems in the genius aesthetic is perhaps the key 
to understanding his mystical turn, because Heidegger, too, approached the limits of 
theory in much the same way as Herder did before him.  Therefore, it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to explore and define the mystical elements in Heidegger's 
thought and its relationship to Meister Eckhart.  Rather, my task is to show how 
Heidegger's understanding of the poet develops first through his reaction to Herder 
and the genius aesthetic, and is not merely an experiment in mysticism, as is often 
supposed.  In doing so, I hope to ultimately shed light as well on the continuing 
relevance of Herder's work for contemporary aesthetics and poetics.
My methodology for this examination is as follows: first, I will examine 
Heidegger's lecture notes from his Summer 1939 Oberseminar on Herder at the 
University of Freiburg, which have only recently been published as the 85th volume 
of the Heideggerian Gesamtausgabe (1999).  These notes do not explicitly concern 
Herder's genius aesthetic, but are rather focused upon Herder's essay “Über den 
Urspung der Sprache,” which itself deals with the question of whether language is 
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divine in origin.  However, there are observations within these notes that directly 
pertain to the very flaw that we have seen in Herder's thinking, and which relate to the 
different course that Heidegger takes in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.
Following this examination of some of the underlying elements of Heidegger's 
critique of Herder, I will examine Heidegger's view of art and of the poet.  I will 
attempt to locate within  Heidegger's philosophy important corollaries to the aspects 
of Herder's genius aesthetic that are outlined in the Shakespeare essay.  To this end, I 
will group my observations in three sections that correspond to the three sections of 
my explanation of the Shakespeare essay in Chapter 3 of this thesis: 1) the sense in 
which the poet relates to nature and to a people, 2) Heidegger's understanding of the 
Greeks; and 3) Heidegger's opposition of the concepts of "Welt" (world) und "Erde" 
(earth), and how this opposition brings art forth.  In all three of these aspects of 
Heidegger's thought, distinctly Herderian overtones are evident, while it is at the 
same time clear that the problematic aspect of Herder's genius aesthetic has been 
sidestepped.  Finally, I will explain Heidegger's notion of the poet within the context 
of Heidegger's well-known dictum that "Sprache ist das Haus des Seins," and I will 
discuss how this formulation avoids the problems that Herder's genius aesthetic faces 
by taking a decisively mystical turn.
5.1  Heidegger's Seminar on Herder's “Über den Urspung der Sprache”
One of the key differences between Herder and Heidegger concerns exactly 
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that which is central to the flaw in Herder's thought outlined in Chapter 4: the notion 
of how to reconcile the poetic universe of the genius with the historical reality whose 
tradition, according to Herder, is both determined and deterministic.  If, however, the 
question of origin for the work of art and the artist can be related not to a given 
cultural history, but rather to a methodology, as Michelson suggests, the strong form 
of historical determinism cited by Herder's critics will no longer constrain the 
poet/genius.
Heidegger's published lecture notes on Herder are just that--notes, rather than 
written lectures, and they are often merely collected phrases and references, as 
opposed to complete sentences.  Still, we may discern Heidegger's intent, from our 
understanding of both Heidegger's and Herder's thought.  Heidegger's main criticism 
of Herder in these notes that is relevant here is his continued questioning of Herder's 
lack of grounding on an ontological level, which, in Heidegger's philosophy, means 
that Herder's work is not grounded primordially in the question of Being [Seyn] itself. 
The importance of this criticism is two-fold for our later explanation of Heidegger's 
poet in comparison to Herder's genius: 1) it represents a shift in emphasis for the 
poetic universe over and against historical reality, decoupling the two in such a way 
as to give primacy to the former as a question of Being, as opposed to attempting to 
ground the former in the mundane reality of the world of "beings," thus rendering 
Boden free of that mundane reality and the historical determinism that plagued Herder 
and his search for a revitalizing genius, and 2) it provides the ground for Heidegger to 
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de-emphasize the active role of the artist, who becomes more of a passive vessel, 
through which epochs of the history of Being speak, than an active genius.  This frees 
Heidegger from the question that puzzled Herder: How does one explain what the 
genius does without giving "rules" for the process, as a Kunstrichter would?  With 
this in mind, let us turn to the lecture notes.
In §20 of the lectures, entitled "Zur grundsätzlichen Auseinandersetzung mit 
Herder," Heidegger questions the metaphysical ground on which Herder's notions of 
language are based.  Heidegger's fragmentary comments include the following:
Herder setzt Wesen der Sprache als Sammlung gefaßter Zeichen von 
Gegenständlichem -- Zeichen, die zugleich "äußern" -- voraus.
Die Frage ist:
1. Recht und Grund und Richtung dieser Wesenssetzung,
2. Entscheidungsbereich dieser Wesenssetzung.
Dazu nötig, Herders Wesenssetzung selbst (und damit die 
metaphysische überhaupt) ursprünglich zu fassen -- auf das 
zurückführen, worauf sie gründet -- was sie aber nicht als solches 
sieht und noch weniger zu erfragen vermag.
Doppeltes zu erfragen:
1. Wesensentwurf des Menschen Seinverständnis -- Sein
2. Wesensentwurf der Sprache Wahrheit des Seins -- Da-sein 
(Heidegger AUUS 27)
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As is the case in all of Heidegger's work, the ontological orientation toward Being 
comes to the fore in his questioning.  In this case, the grounding of Herder's 
metaphysical assertions of the nature of language is important.  As mentioned in 
section 2.2 of this thesis, Herder shifted Hamann's theological assumption away from 
the notion of language (in its poetic form) as a direct communication of the divine to 
the poet as prophet toward a view of language as a living organism.  For Herder, the 
transcendent and immanent divine truths of language as a living organism are 
communicated through nature.  He sees genius in the poet's ability to remain close to 
that source, while at the same time communicating in primal language the 
aforementioned truths to those within his linguistic and cultural milieu.  
In the passage cited above, Heidegger questions the basis for that shift, not in 
the sense of arguing for a return to Hamann's theology, but rather in the sense of 
asking in a secular manner for the ground of Herder's metaphysical assumptions: 
what is the basis for this relationship between the poet as a human being, and 
language in its essence, that it allows such truths to be communicated?  If such a 
connection is possible within any given historical-cultural context, as Herder suggests 
in the very core assertions of his views of language that form the basis for his 
development of the genius aesthetic, is there not, then, a deeper, more primordial 
connection between human beings, language and Being itself that is pre-supposed in 
such a metaphysics?  These questions appear to form the core objection that 
Heidegger has to Herder's view of language, which becomes clearer when one 
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considers Heidegger's remarks in §32 of the lectures.  In these notes, he outlines 
Herder's approach and praises him while at the same time criticizing him for lacking a 
proper ground for understanding language outside of its rejection of the neoclassical, 
rational models of his time:
Die "ursprüngliche Kraft" in allem gesucht und ihre unmittelbare 
Äußerung -- im Gewoge bleiben.
Geschichtlich wesentlich: erweckend -- vorausahnend und -weisend 
für jenen Gang des deutschen Dichtens und Sagens und Handelns.
Aber nicht "absolut" -- und vollends nicht für sich zu nehmen, seine 
Gegnerschaft ins bloße Positive umbiegend....
Herder: Geschichtlich eine große Besinnung für sein Zeitalter -- das 
die Aufgabe begriffen!
Wie aber -- wenn Herder zum Kronzeugen für etwas, was gleichsehr 
hinter ihm und der deutschen Bewegung zurückbleibt und nur aus der 
Ohnmacht des Denkens sein scheinbares Recht herleitet; wobei -- 
recht besehen -- ganz Anderes wirklich ist als das 'All-Leben' dieser 
kläglichen 'Lebenslehren' (AUUS 43).
If Herder's positive assertions are grounded in nothing more than the rejection of the 
abstract, rational rules of previous metaphysical conceptions of language, then 
according to Heidegger, the deeper ground of language is missed, as he claims in §33 
of his notes:
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Sicher und scharf in der Kritik des 'Rationalismus' und 'Sensualismus.' 
-- Und dennoch: ein sehr gefährliches Spiel, weil scheinbar im Recht 
gegen den Rationalismus und für das Erleben.  Ein Vermischen und 
Verwischen alles Fragens -- und der echten 'Besinnung.'
[...]Und wo er die Empfindung anruft und ihren Ton, da übersieht er, 
wie gerade all dieses auf einem tieferen Grunde ruht, der freilich nicht 
das Gegenstück zur Empfindung ist (die Vernunft) und nicht der 
Begriff und nicht der Absicht und die τέχνη -- aber die Ge-stimmtheit  
des Seyns und seiner Wahrheit (AUUS 44)
In other words, Herder's critique, while pointing out the weaknesses of the abstract 
theoretical models of literary criticism in assessing poetry, is not sufficient in itself to 
ask about the ground of its own truth.  To put it another way, Herder's conscious 
avoidance of putting forth an abstract theoretical model, as shown in his poetic 
conception of language in and genius, merely avoids the question of its own ground 
by stopping at the level of poetic metaphor.  Heidegger's critique addresses, in fact, 
the very problem Eva Knodt raises decades later with respect to Herder, when she 
argues that Herder paradoxically recognizes history as a poetic fiction while at the 
same time insisting that history serve to constitute the reality of our culture.
Heidegger's solution to this is the idea of primordial time, the idea that 
existence itself is temporal.  Here he speaks not of chronological history, but of 
"historicity" (Geschichtlichkeit), of the being-historical character of existence: that 
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Being itself is revealed in epochs.  Therefore, language arises neither independently 
and organically, nor as an outgrowth of specific historical cultures, it is rather that 
Being itself "speaks" or shows itself through language, and it is in this sense that 
Heidegger refers to the "Gestimmtheit des Seyns und seiner Wahrheit" in his lecture 
notes.  In §45, Heidegger expresses the importance of "historicity," which one may 
contrast with  Herder's concept of history.  Historicity comes from the deeper ground 
of Being, which Herder does not investigate:
Unsere Besinnung keine Sprachphilosophie, auch keine Philosophie 
des Wortes.  Die Philosophie hat überhaupt, zumal als 
seynsgeschichtliches Denken, kein "Worüber" als Gegenstand -- auch 
nicht das Seyn.  Vielmehr "ist" sie des Seyns in der Weise, wie dieses 
die Geschichtlichkeit von Geschichte als Gründung der Wahrheit des 
Seyns entscheidet. (Die Loslassung in die Historie während des 
Zeitalters der Metaphysik.) (AUUS 51)
Heidegger thus avoids the problem that Herder encountered.  Herder's attempt to 
ground the poetic universe of the genius within historical reality was burdened with 
having to explain how one could be both bound by a certain historical determinism 
and at the same time "rejuvenate" the culture that is handed down or determined. 
Heidegger's notion of primordial time, with its being-historical character, decouples 
the time of historical reality on the "ontic" level of beings from the ontological time 
of Being itself, which shows itself not as an object concretely through language or 
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words, but speaks itself as its own truth and is understood through language.  This 
view of language through fundamental ontology allows Heidegger to create the sort 
of methodological approach suggested by Michelsen as a solution to Herder's 
problem.
This will have profound consequences for Heidegger's understanding of the 
role of the poet in response to the genius outlined by Herder.  Heidegger's view of the 
poet's role in creation differs from Herder's view of the genius precisely because of 
this shift from the historically deterministic character of language to language as a 
characteristic of primordial time.  How, then, does Heidegger's view of art and the 
poet shift away from Herder's genius aesthetic as a result of this change from Herder's 
historical determinism toward primordial time?  In Heidegger's work  Der Ursprung 
des Kunstwerkes, we find the result of this shift in the way that Heidegger delineates 
the role of the poet.
5.2 The Origin of the Work of Art in Relation to Language
In putting the question of the "origin" of the work of art into context for our 
comparison of Heidegger's poet with Herder's genius, it is important to recall yet 
another of Heidegger's comments on the origins of language with respect to Herder as 
it connects with history and art. Herder formed the question of the origin of language, 
but only really as a question of origination, within a given cultural milieu, and not as 
an aspect of fundamental ontology.  Heidegger comments on this in his notes on 
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Herder in §84:
Dazwischen liegt: Kant -- (Humboldt, Schiller), der deutsche  
Idealismus -- (Schelling, Hegel), Geist -- Geschichte -- Kunst -- und 
verborgen und unerkannt auch Hölderlin.
All dieses nicht da, nicht wesentlich, sondern im Gegenteil:  
"Wissenschaft," "Forschung" und sonst bleibt es beim "Alten," d.h. wie 
Herder sie stellte, die Ursprungsfrage!  Wie mußte er sie denn gestellt 
haben, daß nur die Wege und Mittel sich änderten -- Doch auch nur als 
Entstehungsfrage! (AUUS 103)
When we recall Herder's shift in understanding of the divine aspect of poetry and 
language from Hamann's theological conception (the very context in which 
Heidegger's above quotation comes in his Herder lectures), we remember that 
Herder's elevation of poetry as a means of expressing a divine truth within a culture is 
an aesthetic response to the question of transcendence and immanence.  Divine truth 
comes to light in various religions, mythologies and poetry, all specific to a given 
cultural milieu for a people, as Herder argued in “Älteste Urkunde des 
Menschengeschlechts.”  For Heidegger the limits in Herder's approach have to do 
with the question that remains on the level of origination.  Heidegger, having 
decoupled historical time from the equation of the origin of language, wants to go 
beyond this notion of origination and directly to the question of origin itself: that is to 
say, he wishes to ask not about language in relation to a culture, but about language in 
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relation to Being itself (which then later informs a culture).  In Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes, Heidegger does precisely this.
5.2.1 The Relationship of the Poet to Nature/Culture
As one might expect in a system that stresses origin as Being instead of 
origination within culture, the role of the poet in the act of creation is de-emphasized 
in Heidegger's thought in contrast to Herder's emphasis on genius in his aesthetics. 
Heidegger's ontological shift described above makes such a shift in emphasis of the 
poet's importance necessary from a theoretical standpoint.  I will now examine this 
ontological independence of the work of art from the subjectivity of the artist. 
Following this explanation, I will proceed to an explanation of "world" and "earth" 
dichotomy in Heidegger's thought.  I will address the concepts in this order because 
an understanding of Heidegger's ontological shift away from Herder is precisely the 
background that one needs to understand Heidegger's original concept of "earth" in 
opposition to "world," which is often misunderstood as merely mystical.
According to Gadamer, Heidegger's concept of the poet does not have the 
status of the genius for Herder.  Heidegger, like Herder, does not draw a hard and fast 
distinction between beauty as an aesthetic concept and truth as a concept strictly 
within the purview of logic.  For Heidegger, the truth of the work of art comes not 
from the greatness of the genius's ability to speak to his cultural milieu, but rather, 
from the being-historical nature of the work of art itself: "Das Kunstwerk eröffnet auf 
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seine Weise das Sein des Seienden.  Im Werk geschieht diese Eröffnung, d.h. das 
Entbergen, d.h. die Wahrheit des Seienden.  Im Kunstwerk hat sich die Wahrheit des 
Seienden ins Werk gesetzt.  Die Kunst ist das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit" 
(Heidegger, UK 34).  This is so because any way in which beings (here referring to 
that represented within the work of art)  are shown is a manifestation of Being.  This 
calls to mind Michelsen's suggestion for  a methodological approach to origin outside 
of historical reality.  Interestingly, Heidegger follows that passage directly with the 
following question: "Was ist die Wahrheit selbst, daß sie zu Zeiten als Kunst 
ereignet?" (UK 34).  Here we come to the question of the event or Ereignis in which 
the work of art comes into being.  This concept was described as well in Herder's 
work in terms of Eräugnis, whereby the creative spirit is allowed to flow naturally in 
its time and place, and not be constrained by the "rules."  It is an event that comes to 
pass through the possibilities of the new language of the time.  Heidegger describes 
much the same, but he removes the constraint of rules and the artist's intentions:
Doch ist das Werk jemals an sich zugänglich?  Damit dies glücken 
könnte, wäre nötig, das Werk aus allen Bezügen zu solchem, was ein 
anderes ist als es selbst, herauszurücken, um es allein für sich auf sich 
beruhen zu lassen.  Aber dahin geht doch schon das eigenste Absehen 
des Künstlers.  Das Werk soll durch ihn zu seinem reinen 
Insichselbststehen entlassen sein.  Gerade in der großen Kunst, und 
von ihr allein ist hier die Rede, bleibt der Künstler gegenüber dem 
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Werk etwas Gleichgültiges, fast wie ein im Schaffen sich selbst 
vernichtender Durchgang für den Hervorgang des Werkes (UK 35).
This "letting-go" of the artist for Heidegger certainly owes something to the influence 
of Meister Eckhart, who coined the term Gelassenheit that runs throughout 
Heidegger's middle and late philosophical work.  However, given the context of 
Heidegger's admittedly (by Gadamer) conscious reaction to the genius aesthetic in 
this essay, Heidegger's motives for taking this mystical turn become clear.  It is a 
necessary move to avoid Herder's problem of trying to explain the intention of the 
artist over and against the historical determinism he posited.
Not only does Heidegger's view correspond to a presumed corrective of 
Herder, Heidegger also seeks to make an argument against the work of art as an 
"object" and for it as an expression of Being, which he does by decoupling the work 
of art from the intention of the artist.  In a manner familiar to those who know 
Herder's thought, this is part of an attempt to liberate art from its critics.  By way of 
example, Heidegger mentions the way that specific works of the ancient world are 
received in the modern world, and how this reception falls short of appreciating the 
work of art as it would have been appreciated within its original cultural context:
Die "Ägineten" in der Münchener Sammlung, die "Antigone" des 
Sophokles in der besten kritischen Ausgabe, sind als die Werke, die sie 
sind, aus ihrem eigenen Wesensraum herausgerissen. [...]Weltentzug 
und Weltzerfall sind nie mehr rückgängig zu machen.  Die Werke sind 
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nicht mehr die, die sie waren.  Sie selbst sind es zwar, die uns da 
begegnen, aber sie selbst sind die Gewesenen.  Als die Gewesenen 
stehen sie uns im Bereich der Überlieferung und Aufbewahrung 
entgegen.  Fortan bleiben sie nur solche Gegenstände.  Ihr 
Entgegenstehen ist zwar noch eine Folge jenes vormaligen 
Insichstehens, aber es ist nicht mehr dieses selbst.  Dieses ist aus ihnen 
geflohen.  Aller Kunstbetrieb, er mag aufs äußerste gesteigert werden 
und alles um der Werke selbst willen betrieben, reicht immer nur bis an 
das Gegenstandsein der Werke (UK 36).
This dismissal of the mission of Kunstbetrieb, along with similar references in the 
adjoining passages to Kunstkenner und Kunstrichter, relates the proper appreciation 
of art to historical reality.  This is so, not in the deterministic sense of an art that 
grows from inside a culture, but one that grows through the prism of primordial time, 
and shows itself in the world as that which grounds a culture itself.  It is this 
understanding that makes the work of art no longer an "object" of understanding, but 
a mode of revelation of Being itself.  One might expect, then, that Heidegger does not 
attempt to articulate an appreciation for the art of another culture, whose artistic 
impulse would, according to his own theory, be foreign.  However, like Herder, 
Heidegger feels a certain bond with the ancient Greeks.
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5.2.2 Heidegger's kinship with the Greeks
In the above-quoted passage Heidegger refers to the inapplicability of today's 
cultural understanding to the greatness of the work of Sophocles.  Similarly, Herder 
viewed Sophocles as the example of genius from ancient times whose cultural values 
were not applicable in the modern world.  Heidegger, like Herder, shares an 
appreciation for the art of the ancient Greeks, while recognizing the futility of 
attempts to judge contemporary art by ancient standards.   Each thinker maintains a 
certain kinship to the Greeks, independent of the standards or rules of art.  Whereas 
for Herder this kinship was about an inner connectedness to nature and firm 
rootedness within a culture, Heidegger, with the ontological twist that I have 
described, modifies this understanding accordingly.  It is not the inner connectedness 
to nature and rootedness within a culture that Heidegger sees as important in the 
ancient (here decidedly pre-Socratic) Greeks, it is their openness to Being on an 
ontological level.
Just as Herder would like to get back to this inner connectedness to nature 
once possessed by the ancient Greeks, without copying their rules for art, so too, does 
Heidegger wish to recollect the Greek concept of aletheia (unconcealedness) in 
understanding truth: "Wahrheit meint Wesen des Wahren.  Wir denken es aus der 
Erinnerung an das Wort der Griechen [aletheia] heißt die Unverborgenheit des 
Seienden.[...] Ist dazu eine Erneuerung der griechischen Philosophie nötig? 
Keineswegs. Eine Erneuerung, selbst wenn dies Unmögliche möglich wäre, hülfe uns 
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nichts" (UK 48).  The important thing here is that Heidegger, like Herder, sees in the 
ancient Greeks an inner notion of truth to be used in art that is not meant to be copied  
in the outer properties of a work of art, but rather to be felt in connection with nature, 
which for Heidegger, is then taken to the ontological level of Being.
5.2.3 World and Earth in Heidegger's Thought
As mentioned above, for Heidegger the "letting-go" of the intentions of the 
artist is a necessary condition for Being to show itself through the work.  This was 
necessary from an ontological standpoint as a device to avoid the problems of 
Herder's genius with respect to the historical determinism of his theory, which was 
grounded not in ontology, but in historical reality.  It would be a mistake, however, to 
assume that because Heidegger has moved beyond the particularities of an 
artist/genius, that he has also somehow rendered cultural grounding in historical 
reality irrelevant to his understanding of the role of the poet and the work of art. 
Indeed, in his book Gelassenheit (1959), Heidegger discusses the difference between 
calculative thought, which rationally asks about the being of things as objects, and 
meditative thinking, which asks about Being itself, and connects the latter specifically 
to the task of the poet.  Heidegger uses the example of the German poet Johann Peter 
Hebel (1760-1826) to relate the poet to nature and culture, in language that is 
evocative of Herder:
Wir werden nachdenklich und fragen: Gehört nicht zu jedem Gedeihen 
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eines gediegenen Werkes die Verwurzelung im Boden einer Heimat? 
Johann Peter Hebel schreibt einmal: 'Wir sind Pflanzen, die -- wir 
mögen's uns gerne gestehen oder nicht -- mit den Wurzeln aus der Erde 
steigen müssen, um im Äther blühen und Früchte tragen zu können.'
Der Dichter will sagen: Wo ein wahrhaft freudiges und heilsames 
Menschenwerk gedeihen soll, muß der Mensch aus der Tiefe des 
heimatlichen Bodens in den Äther hinaufsteigen können.  Äther 
bedeutet hier: die freie Luft des hohen Himmels, den offenen Bereich 
des Geistes. (Heidegger, Gelassenheit 14-15)
How should one understand the idea of Bodenständigkeit, however, if the work of art 
sets itself up as a manifestation of Being on an ontological level?  This stands in 
opposition to Herder's idea of the genius that brings forth the work of art that is 
rooted in the culture.  Heidegger deals with this in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes 
with the concept of "Erde" (earth).  This concept is directly related to the act of 
overcoming the problems of the genius aesthetic.  Gadamer follows his comment on 
Heidegger's reaction to the genius aesthetic (cited in section 1) with the following 
statement: "Es ist in dem Bestreben, die ontologische Struktur des Werkes 
unabhängig von der Subjektivität des Schöpfers oder Betrachters zu verstehen, daß 
Heidegger nun eben dem Begriff der Welt, zu der das Werk gehört und die das Werk 
aufstellt und eröffnet, den Gegenbegriff 'Erde' gebraucht" (Gadamer qtd.  in 
Heidegger UK 105).
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What, then, is the function of "Earth" in Heidegger's theory?  Heidegger links 
it to the Greek notion of Φύσις (physis), as that on which man grounds his dwelling, 
not as a physical or planetary notion, but as that against which the work-being of art 
sets itself so as to first become present.  To put it simply, the "earth" is that necessary 
backdrop of our mundane everyday existence against which the work of art is able to 
set up a "world."  It is the historical grounding through which man perceives 
primordial time. "Earth" itself becomes visible as such only when the "world" of a 
work of art is set up: "Das Werk rückt und hält die Erde selbst in das Offene einer 
Welt.  Das Werk läßt die Erde eine Erde sein" (UK 43).  The transforming power of 
the work of art as a manifestation of Being shows the mundane ordering of beings for 
what it is.  In this sense, "historical reality" as such is no longer a determining 
characteristic in the development of the ideas of the genius, but merely the staging 
ground against which the work of art sets up a world.  Here Heidegger solves the 
contradiction that Knodt points to in Herder's work.  Rather than posit historical 
reality as the  necessary ground for the poetic universe in which the genius brings 
forth art, as Herder does, Heidegger grounds the work in the primordial time of 
Being, with "historical reality" becoming visible as "earth" first through the "world" 
of a work of art.  With this methodological shift, Heidegger has successfully changed 
the relationship of historical reality to the poetic universe from Herder's problematic 
formulation, in a manner that accomplishes what Michelsen suggested when he 
argued for "origin" as a methodological rather than historical approach.
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5.3 Language as the "Haus des Seins"
In looking at Heidegger's notion of the work of art in the context of Herder's 
genius aesthetic, it is important to return to the notion of language and poetry.  Setting 
up a world through the work of art is, for Heidegger, essentially poetic in nature: 
"Wahrheit als die Lichtung und Verbergung des Seienden geschieht, indem sie 
gedichtet wird.  Alle Kunst ist als Geschehenlassen der Ankunft der Wahrheit des 
Seienden als eines solchen im Wesen Dichtung" (UK 73-4).  In his essay 
“Phänomenologie, Hermeneutik, Metaphysik” (1983), Gadamer explains Heidegger's 
view of language (which Heidegger famously formulated as "das Haus des Seins"): 
“Sprachlichkeit ist das Element, in dem wir leben, und daher ist Sprache nicht so sehr 
Gegenstand -- von welcher natürlichen oder wissenschaftlichen Bewandtnis immer – 
als vielmehr der Vollzug unseres Da, des >Da<, das wir sind” (Gadamer 105-6).  In 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology, language has the role of being the "Ereignis" 
(event) in which Being becomes present, in which truth comes to light in the work of 
art.  It is this understanding of language, along with Heidegger's idea of art as 
essentially poetry, that forms the background for Heidegger's treatment of specific 
poets and their works.  For example, rather than view the poet Friedrich Hölderlin 
(1770-1843) as a genius in Herderian terms, Heidegger views Hölderlin's work as that 
which sets up a "world" that shows the human being in its essence against the 
backdrop of the "earth," which in turn shows the human essence as being a 
"Gespräch."  To make his point, Heidegger in his Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins 
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Dichtung (1944) interprets Hölderlin's unfinished poem: "Viel hat erfahren der  
Mensch / Der Himmlischen viele genannt /  Seit ein Gespräch wir sind / Und hören 
können voneinander" as follows:
Wir – die Menschen – sind ein Gespräch.  Dieses ist jedoch nicht nur 
eine Weise, wie Sprache sich vollzieht, sondern als Gespräch nur ist 
Sprache wesentlich. [...]Aber was heißt nun ein >>Gespräch<<? 
Offenbar das Miteinandersprechen über etwas [...]Das Hörenkönnen ist 
nicht erst eine Folge des Miteinandersprechens, sondern eher 
umgekehrt die Voraussetzung dafür. Redenkönnen und Hörenkönnen 
sind gleich ursprünglich.  Wir sind ein Gespräch – und das will sagen: 
wir können voneinander hören (Heidegger EHD 38-39).
This "Gespräch" should not be understood as dialectic or as dialogue, however, but as 
"Ereignis" in which “die Götter uns in das Gespräch bringen” (EHD 40).  The 
mention of "gods" here, when Heidegger previously spoke of a more secularized 
notion of "Being" (Sein/Seyn), may make one wonder if Heidegger is not retreating in 
some way from Herder's position to  Hamann's theological aesthetics.  Strictly 
speaking, this would not be accurate, although Heidegger was acutely aware of the 
debate between Hamann and Herder in this regard.  This is evidenced by Heidegger's 
quotation of Hamann's letter to Herder from 10 August 1784, in which  Hamann 
stresses that "Vernunft ist Sprache, [logos, language]" (Heidegger, Die Sprache 13). 
Heidegger's approach does not focus on language as reason, but rather it takes a 
 65
mystical turn away from reason and "calculative" thinking toward a "meditative" 
approach on language as such.  It would seem, in the end, that Heidegger's embrace 
of mysticism along the lines of Meister Eckhart's theology is arguably the result, in 
part, of responding to the flaws in Herder's aesthetics.  This can be traced back to the 
roots of Herder's thought, and it comes out of Herder's debate with Hamann.  The 
poet as genius in Herder's aesthetics thus becomes reduced in Heidegger's work to the 
contemplative "Hausfreund," understood in the context of language as the "Haus des 
Seins."
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6 Conclusion
It is my hope that I have shown that the intellectual background of Heidegger's 
poetics owes much to the genius aesthetic formulated by Herder in the Sturm und 
Drang period.  In fact,  Herder's failed genius aesthetic gave Heidegger a ready-made 
template with which to work, to which he was able to apply his ontological project to 
revive some of the key aspects of Herder's work.  The significance of this finding is 
clear.  The continuing relevance of Herder's work and the ideas of the Sturm und 
Drang in poetics, well past the eighteenth century, cannot be denied.  If Heidegger's 
work owes a debt to Herder, Herder's work surely bears the need for closer 
examination.  This is especially true if one considers the impact of Heidegger's work 
on poetics among scholars and authors within the field of German literature, 
informing as it does the work of Emil Staiger (1908-1987), Ingeborg Bachmann 
(1926-1973) and others.  The originality of Heidegger's ontological approach is not 
undercut by the suggestion that Herder's failed project may have influenced it. 
Instead, the need for Heidegger's ontological approach is only emphasized further, 
and at the same time made more comprehensible, by understanding Herder's ideas, 
which Heidegger was dealing with when he formulated his own approach.
A number of possibilities for further research may result from the findings of 
this thesis.  The wide-ranging consequences of Herder's theological debate with 
Hamann in understanding poetics and fundamental ontology is an area that seems rich 
with research potential.  For example, how might Herder's ideas of language and 
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genius, when understood in the context of the later development of Heidegger's 
thought, relate to the development of hermeneutics that came about in response to 
Heidegger's observations on language as that which mediates our experience of 
Being?  Can Heidegger's abandonment of hermeneutics be explained by the sorts of 
limitations in theory that ultimately doomed Herder's system to failure?  Heidegger's 
difficulty in bridging the gap between theory and poetic metaphor in explaining what 
is affirmed in the statement that language is the “Haus des Seins,” as distinct from 
Being itself, in conjunction with Herder's difficulties, may lead to a fruitful discussion 
of the usefulness of poetic metaphor  when discussing language, and whether such 
metaphors ultimately limit our understanding of language, as opposed to what Herder 
and Heidegger intended.  A better understanding of Heidegger's reaction to Herder's 
genius aesthetic as a background to Heidegger's poetics may help scholars understand 
the otherwise relatively unexplored inconsistencies between Heidegger's affirmation 
of language as the house of Being and the influence of Meister Eckhart's mysticism 
and its contrary emphasis on negation in understanding Being.  Even the 
contemporary philosophy of technology, with its strong influence from Heidegger's 
use of the pre-Socratics to juxtapose the essence of art with technology, and its 
emphasis on Bodenständigkeit, might well be enriched with an understanding of 
Herder, whose reflections on the relationship of language and culture might give 
added weight to Heidegger's notions of poeisis taken from the pre-Socratics, even if 
only to explain why Heidegger felt the need to take this discussion beyond the level 
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of culture and into the realm of ontology.
Ultimately, the suggestion that Herder's call for a new literature within the 
Sturm und Drang program might explain the development of one of Heidegger's 
central trains of thought, may serve to open debate among Herder and Heidegger 
scholars alike on the relationship between art, poetry, language, nature and culture. 
This can only be a positive development for scholars who study Herder, and may 
serve to emphasize and heighten the relevance of Herder's work for a new generation 
of scholars.
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Notes
¹Herder here evokes an image of Boden that will be echoed 150 years later by 
Heidegger in his concern for Bodenständigkeit when he uses the same image: "Und 
alle sein Wesen, Tugend und Vollkommenheit beruhe ja darauf, daß es nicht das erste 
ist: daß aus dem Boden der Zeit, eben die andre Pflanze erwuchs" (Herder, 
Shakespeare 1:309)
²In the late nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who 
described himself as a genius unrestrained by the rules of critics, penned a collection 
of poems, the title of which, “Dionysos-Dithyramben,” suggests a possible response 
to Herder's call for a German dithyrambic poet.  Nietzsche's nihilist approach to 
genius, however, is at odds with Herder's project of revitalizing culture.
³See, for instance, the following middle and late works of Heidegger, all of 
which include passages relating to the poet: Gelassenheit.  Stuttgart: Günther Neske, 
1959; "Hebel--der Hausfreund" in Gesamtausgabe Band 13: Aus der Erfahrung des 
Denkens.  Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983; "Sprache und Heimat" in 
Gesamtausgabe Band 13: Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens.  Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1983; "Wozu Dichter?" in Holzwege. Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1950.
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